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Attorney Fees: Compensating the Attorney Pro Se
Litigant in Civil Rights Cases
Introduction
A significant question about federal statutes that protect the civil rights
of individuals is whether they allow claimants in civil rights cases to receive
attorney fees from their adversaries. Often, the answer makes the differ-
ence between going to court or not. Our federal legislators have recognized
that civil rights statutes are ineffectual without a guarantee that prevailing
parties will be awarded attorney fees in their cases.' The United States
Congress pointed out that victims must be encouraged to prosecute their
claims individually because the government by itself is incapable of pro-
tecting the civil rights of all persons.2 In turn, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (section 1988) in 1976 to permit fee
awards under certain civil rights statutes that previously did not explicitly
grant them.3
Without section 1988, many persons who are victimized by civil rights
violations would not bring their actions to court, due to the time and
expense involved.4 Hence, section 1988 is designed to encourage litigation
in which prevailing litigants may recover attorney fees. 5
The issue of granting attorney fees to prevailing claimants raises ques-
tions, however, about claimants who litigate their actions pro se., The
1. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AnDm. NEWS 5908.
2. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 5.
3. Section 1988 reads in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
The civil rights statutes covered by § 1988 are broadly summarized as follows: § 1981 (no
discrimination in contracts, transactions, civil litigation, and criminal proceedings); § 1982 (no
discrimination in real or personal property transactions); § 1983 (no violations of federal
constitutional or statutory rights by state and local officials); § 1985 (no conspiracies to violate
civil rights); § 1986 (no official neglect in preventing civil rights violations); title IX (no
discrimination based on sex or visual impairment in certain programs receiving federal financial
assistance); and title VI (no racial discrimination in federally funded programs).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT
AVARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 288 (1981).
5. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 5.
6. Pro se means "for one's own behalf" and is used to describe litigants who represent
themselves in legal cases. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990). Another term used is
in propria persona, which means "in one's own proper person" (also known as pro per). Id.
at 792. The latter term has sometimes been used to identify a pro se litigant who is an attorney.
For purposes of this note, pro se will be used to refer to all claimants, attorneys, and
nonattorneys, who litigate without counsel.
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federal circuit courts have reached conflicting opinions on whether attorney
pro se litigants are entitled to collect attorney fees.7 Kay v. Ehrler is the
most recent federal circuit court case addressing this issue. In Kay, the
Sixth Circuit resoundingly rejected awarding attorney fees to an attorney
pro se litigant.9 The Sixth Circuit's decision was subsequently affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court, thus resolving the conflicting results
among the circuit courts. 0
This note will demonstrate that attorneys who litigate their claims pro
se should collect attorney fees under section 1988, just as other claimants
may if they win their cases. The note begins with a background explanation
of section 1988 and provides some brief comments on the legislative intent
behind the statute. Next, the note discusses and critiques the reasoning of
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kay and why that decision should
not have been affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Finally, this note points out that the Kay court failed to fully analyze
section 1988, relying instead on inapposite circuit court opinions in making
its decision. Had the Kay court delved into section 1988, it would have
found that section 1988 is meant to encourage civil rights litigation in
many forms by private parties, even if it means awarding attorney pro se
litigants with attorney fees.
Historical Origin of Section 1988
In Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society," the United States Su-
preme Court settled the issue of whether claimants are automatically
entitled to attorney fees if they prevail.' 2 The Supreme Court held that
under the so-called "American rule,' ' 3 litigants are not to be awarded
fees as a matter of practice.' 4 However, the Court recognized three excep-
tions to this rule." First, attorney fees are recoverable when a party
preserves a fund or a right for the benefit of others.' 6 Second, a court
may award fees when the losing party has brought a claim in bad faith.'
7
7. The Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have permitted fee awards. See Ellis v. Cassidy,
625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980); Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1129 (1986). The Sixth Circuit has not. See Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967 (6th Cir.
1990).
8. 900 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1990).
9. Id. at 972.
10. Kay v. Ehrler, ..... U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1435 (1991).
11. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
12. PRAcTi SNG LAw INST., CoURT AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES: LITIGATING ANTITRUST,
CI.VI RIGHTS, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND SECURITIES CASES 13 (1987).
13. "The traditional 'American rule' is that attorney's fees are not awardable to the winning
party ... unless statutoily or contracturally authorized." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th
ed. 1990).
14. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
15. Id. at 257.
16. Id. This "common fund" doctrine arises, for example, in class action suits, antitrust
cases, and securities litigation.
17. Id. at 258. "[A] court may assess attorneys' fees for the 'willful disobedience of a court
order' . . . or when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
[Vol. 44:695
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Third, fees may be granted to the prevailing party under statutory au-
thority. 8
Nearly 200 fee-shifting statutes exist at the federal level.' 9 Depending
upon their language, fee-shifting statutes are either mandatory or discre-
tionary.20 Among the various federal statutes allowing an award of attorney
fees, section 1988 is the most commonly used. 21 Title 42, section 1988 of
the United States Code was passed by Congress partly in response to the
holding in Alyeska.Y2 In that case, the Supreme Court refused attorney
fees to the claimant because a civil rights statute failed to authorize the
imposition of attorney fees. 23 Section 1988 remedies this result by providing
that prevailing parties may be awarded reasonable attorney fees as part
of their costs under various civil rights laws that in themselves do not
address the question of attorney fees.
24
Since passage of section 1988 in 1976, prevailing plaintiffs have almost
always been awarded attorney fees "unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust."21 Most "special circumstances" alleged by
losing parties have been rejected by the courts, except when a defendant
is actually a minor participant in a case primarily involving other defen-
dants. 26 By contrast, the courts have been reluctant to grant attorney fees
to prevailing defendants. 27 Instead, the rule for remitting legal fees to a
defendant is invoked when the plaintiff's suit is considered frivolous and
vexatious.
2
1
Despite an ostensibly liberal use of section 1988 in most civil rights
cases, 29 the federal courts have overwhelmingly declined - except in the
oppressive reasons."' Id. (quoting Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399,
426-28 (1923), and F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 126-31 (1974)).
18. Id. at 260-61.
19. PRACTISINo LAW INST., supra note 12, at 30. Some examples of fee-shifting statutes are
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988);
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1988); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1988); Packers and
Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1988); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988);
and the Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988).
20. Note, Administrative Law-Attorney Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act-
Commercial Interest and In Propria Persona Appearances, 24 WAYNE L. Rnv. 1045, 1049
(1978).
21. PRACTISING LAW IN sT., supra note 12, at 31.
22. S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 1, at 4. See supra notes 11-18 on Alyeska.
23. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267-69 (1975).
24. See supra note 3.
25. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
26. PRACTISINo LAW INsT., supra note 12, at 32-33.
27. Annotation, Construction and Application of Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976 (Amending 42 U.S.C.S. § 1988), Providing That Court May AlloW Prevailing Party,
Other Than United States, Reasonable Attorney's Fees in Certain Civil Rights Actions, 43
A.L.R. FED. 243, 275-76 (1979).
28. Id. at 276.
29. The statutory language, intent, and standard for attorney fees under § 1988 are the
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District of Columbia Circuit - to grant attorney fees to nonlawyer pro
se litigants who prevailed on their claims.30 However, a distinction has
been drawn when the pro se litigants happened to be attorneys." Until
the United States Supreme Court decision in Kay v. Ehrler,32 questions
still loomed among the federal courts as to whether section 1988 permitted
the payment of attorney fees for lawyers who bring civil rights claims
independently and without legal counsel.
The lack of unanimity stemmed from the failure of section 1988 to
address pro se litigants. Consequently, *whenever the question of pro se
litigants arose, courts resorted to statutory interpretation to find an an-
swer.33 According to the United States Congress, section 1988 is meant to
be interpreted broadly. 4 The Senate Judiciary Committee wrote in its
report on section 1988 (Senate Report) that "[Clongress has instructed the
courts to use the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve
the goals of our civil rights laws."
3 5
The Senate Report explains that the chief purpose of section 1988 is to
"remedy the anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws" that resulted from
the Alyeska decision in the United States Supreme Court.3 6 In addition,
the Senate Report also underscores the fact that attorney fees are to be
encouraged because of the government's dependence on private parties to
enforce civil rights legislation 37 and because they eliminate cost barriers to
same for 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (which awards counsel fees in suits arising under title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a law prohibiting discrimination or segregation based on race,
color, religion or national origin in places of public accommodation) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k) (which grants attorney fees in suits arising under title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a law
barring discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin).
Thus, the reasoning in § 1988 cases has applied equally to § 2000a-3(b) and § 2000c-5(k) cases.
See Annotation, supra note 27, at 249-50; Lawrence v. Staats, 586 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 n.3
(D.D.C. 1984).
30. The circuit court in the District of Columbia began recognizing that pro se litigants,
attorneys, and nonattorneys, are entitled to legal fees under certain statutes since a federal
district court ruling in Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd by order sub noma,
Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The circuit has been most liberal in Freedom
of Information Act case;. See, e.g., Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Jones v. United States Secret Serv., 81 F.R.D. 700 (D.D.C. 1979).
31. See supra note 7.
32. See supra note 10.
33. The Supreme Co-art observed, in United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297-98 (1970),
"The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory language that meaning that nurtures
the policies underlying Isgislation is one that guides us when circumstances [are] not plainly
covered by the terms of a statute .. ." See also International Tel. & Tel. v. General Tel. &
Elec., 518 F.2d 913, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1975).
34. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 3.
35. Id. Several courts have also ruled that § 1988 should be interpreted broadly. See Williams
v. Fairburn, 702 F.2d 973, 976 (l1th Cir. 1983) ("The basis for allowing such broad [statutory]
interpretation is to'facilitate private enforcement."); see also Northcross v. Board of Educ. of
Memphis City Sch., 611 F.2d 624, 633 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
36. S. Rm,. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 1.
37. This concept is sometimes known as the "private attorney general" theory mentioned
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/6
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courts.3 8 The House of Represenatives report on section 1988 (House
Report) also recognizes these same two reasons for granting attorney fees,
but it devotes more attention to providing access to legal counsel for those
who cannot afford to use the courts to resolve their grievances. 39 The
House Report notes that plaintiffs in civil rights cases are typically dis-
advantaged persons who are victims of unlawful discrimination. 40 The
House Report concludes that "[i]t would be unfair to impose upon [dis-
advantaged persons] the additional burden of counsel fees when they seek
to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. ' 4'
Kay v. Ehrler and Section 1988
In Kay v. Ehrler,42 the Sixth Circuit used a unique approach in solving
the riddle of pro se litigants and attorney fees. Instead of examining the
intent behind section 1988, the Sixth Circuit borrowed the reasoning from
another case involving legal fees under a different statute. 43 By focusing
on the Freedom of Information Act, 44 the court unfortunately missed an
opportunity to examine section 1988 directly and clarify the differenices of
opinion on fee awards for pro se litigants in civil rights cases.
Richard Kay, a licensed attorney and resident of Florida, ran for the
Democratic nomination for president of the United States in the 1988
election. When Kay was denied the opportunity to place his name on the
Kentucky presidential preference primary ballot,45 he filed an action in
1988, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
against the attorney general and the secretary of state of Kentucky. 46 He
won a summary judgment that declared that two Kentucky statutes were
unconstitutional and in violation of Kay's civil rights.
47
in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), in which the U.S. Supreme Court
said, "If [a plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone, but also as a
'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest impor-
tance." See supra note 25.
38. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2.
39. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 4, at 1.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id.
42. 900 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1990).
43. Id. at 971.
44. See infra note 52.
45. Kay also ran for president in the election of 1980 and faced several campaign obstacles
in Kentucky, whose Board of Elections refused to place his name on its primary ballot. As a
result, Kay filed a suit against the state and successfully won an injunction to stop the
enforcement of § 118.580 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which declared that the "board of
elections shall nominate as presidential preference primary candidates all those generally advo-
cated and nationally recognized as candidates ... for the office of President of the United
States." Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 118.580 (Baldwin 1986); see Kay v. Mills, 490 F. Supp. 844
(E.D. Ky. 1980).
46. Kay, 900 F.2d at 968.
47. Id. The language of § 118.581 requiring candidates to be "nationally recognized" before
1991]
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The federal district court awarded actual court costs to Kay, but refused
to grant him attorney fees. 4 The district court reasoned that it should
follow the Sixth Circuit precedent in denying attorney fees to pro se
litigants.49 The Sixth Circuit, relying heavily on a decision it made regarding
attorney fees in Falcone v. Internal Revenue Service, affirmed the decision
of the district court. 5  _
The Sixth Circuit offered no analysis for refusing attorney fees specif-
ically under section 1988. Instead, the court borrowed its own reasoning
from Falcone, a case involving the recovery of attorney fees under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)3 2 and applied it to section 1988,
although the two statutes are entirely different fee-shifting statutes.
The Sixth Circuit relied on three major conclusions from the Falcone
case when it decided that attorney fees should not be granted to pro se
attorney-litigants.53 First, the FOIA was meant to encourage claimants to
obtain legal counsel, through which they would receive professional advice
about the merits of their claims. 54 Second, compensating pro se litigants
with attorney fees should be prevented because it would otherwise spark
a "cottage industry"35 of inactive lawyers who support themselves through
self-generating litigation. 6 Finally, in drafting the FOIA, Congress did not
contemplate opportunity costs - the billable hours a lawyer forgoes in
litigating the case at hand - as actual pecuniary loss which should be
compensated.5
7
In Kay, the Sixth Circuit used these arguments about the FOIA to deny
attorney fees to the petitioner. The Sixth Circuit concluded, without
appearing on the ballot repeats verbatim § 118.580, which was previously repealed. Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 118.581 (Baldwin 1986). Section 118.611 reads in part: "Before any candidate's
name is placed upon the official ballot ... for a presidential primary ... , the candidate must
deposit with the secretary of state the sum of one thousand dollars." Id. § 118.611 (Baldwin
1986).
48. Kay, 900 F.2d at 968-69.
49. Id. at 969.
50. 714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908 (1984).
51. Kay, 900 F.2d at 969.7
52. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)
(1988)). The statute reads in pertinent part that a "court may assess against the United States
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this
section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." Id.
53. Kay, 900 F.2d at 971.
54. Id. (citing Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647). The Sixth Circuit in Falcone also reasoned that
the FOIA was intended to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of legal costs, but this was not
mentioned in the majority opinion in Kay.
55. Id. (citing Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647). A cottage industry describes "the production, for
sale, of goods at home" or "any small-scale, loosely organized industry." RANDOM HousE
Dic1oNAY 459 (2d ed. 1987). The Sixth Circuit Court used the term disparagingly to describe
a venture in which lawyers thrive and create their own work through fee-shifting statutes without
seeking clients.
56. Kay, 900 F.2d at 971 (citing Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647).
57. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/6
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explanation, that although Falcone is a FOIA case, it was not distinguish-
able from the issues raised in Kay.18 The court also added that a statutory
provision for attorney fees assumes an attorney-client relationship and that
no reason exists why pro se attorneys should be treated any differently
from pro se nonattorneys, who are routinely denied attorney fees. 9
Judge Jones' dissenting opinion in Kay viewed Falcone as a distinguish-
able case because of the very fact that it pertained to the FOIA. 60 Judge
Jones noted that the two underlying reasons for section 1988 are to alleviate
the cost of litigation and to reward successful claimants who vindicate
their constitutional rights. 6' Therefore, the statute should not have been
compared with the FOIA.
62
After the United States Supreme Court heard the case on appeal, it
affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding, but provided its own rationale for
denying fees to attorney pro se litigants. 63 In its very brief decision, the
Court concluded that the statutory intent behind section 1988 is not entirely
clear."
In light of section 1988's partial intent to help plaintiffs acquire the
assistance of counsel and various public policy concerns, the Court rea-
soned that attorneys should not be awarded fees. 6" The practical consid-
erations raised by the Court were the preference for objective third party
representation to ensure the effective prosecution of claims6 and the
possibility of ethical violations by employing oneself as an attorney.
67
Analysis
The Discrepancy Between Kay and Falcone
Although some of the arguments of the Sixth Circuit may seem con-
vincing, each of its arguments should be questioned. First, the Kay court
adopted the reasoning used in Falcone, which considered the award of
counsel fees under a separate fee-shifting statute. Not only is the language
between the FOIA and section 1988 different, the two statutes are un-
questionably designed to achieve different goals. 68 Second, section 1988
58. Id.
59. Id. at 971-72. See infra note 128.
60. Id. at 972.
61. Id. at 972-73.
62. Id. at 973.
63. Kay v. Ehrler, -U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 1435, 1438 (1991).
64. Id. at 1437.
65. Id. at 1437-38.
66. The Court criticized the Sixth Circuit's contention that section 1988 was intended to
ensure that attorneys filter out meritless claims. Id. at 1438. The Court concluded that the
statute was meant to encourage the effective prosecution of meritorious claims. Id. at 1439.
67. See infra note 105.
68. The FOIA was passed to encourage the government at all levels to provide classified
documents requested by private citizens. H.R. RE'. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADm. NEws 2418. Section 1988 was passed to ensure that private
entities and state and local governments respect civil rights laws in a wide variety of transactions.
See supra note 3.
1991]
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deals with cases inherently more numerous and complicated than those
under the FOIA. 9 Third, the Sixth Circuit incorrectly viewed the Falcone
reasoning as conclusive even though other circuit courts had reached
entirely different opinions about fee awards for pro se litigants70 prior to
the Supreme Court's affirmance of Kay.7'
The Requirement Qf Legal Expenses
The Kay majority presumed that legal expenses must be incurred under
section 1988 before attorney fees are to be granted.7 2 The court held that
the petitioner had not "incurred any expenses for legal representation,
and, therefore, he [could not] recover under section 1988. ' 73 However, no
language in section 1988 or in the Senate and House reports on the statute
directly suggests that a litigant must incur legal expenses to receive counsel
fees. 74 The most persuasive evidence against the requirement of legal
expenses is the litany of cases in which attorney fees were awarded in
section 1988 cases to litigants not charged for legal services or to litigants
whose attorneys were assisted by law clerks and paralegals.75
The United States Supreme Court in Blum v. Stenson76 overturned a
lower court's refusal to grant counsel fees because the plaintiffs were
served by a free legal aid organization. The Court noted that the legislative
history behind section 1988 gave no indication that Congress intended to
distinguish between private counsel or nonprofit legal service organizations
in calculating fee avards.77 In addition, the federal district court in Keyes
v. School District No. P8 awarded fees to a lawyer working pro bono
publico,79 holding that the fact the attorney did not charge for his services
should have no effect on the court's judgment to award attorney fees. 0
Fees are routinely awarded to court-appointed lawyers, although such
attorneys are assigned at no cost to litigants."' Moreover, courts generally
69. Section 1988 is a far-reaching law covering disparate civil rights laws relating to discrim-
ination based on race, sex or disability. See supra note 3.
70. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit would follow a precedent established in the same circuit.
However, even under the FOIA, there are different rulings among the circuit courts about fee
awards for pro se litigants. See infra note 163.
71. See supra note 10.
72. Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1990).
73. Id.
74. The requirement of attorney fees under the FOIA is also unresolved. For example, the
court in Cuneo v. Rurnsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977), held that legal expenses do
not have to be incurred to obtain counsel fees, despite the conclusion in Falcone.
75. See infra note 82.
76. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
77. Id. at 894. Accord Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[Wle conclude
it is inappropriate to corsider that the prevailing plaintiff's attorney was working for a legal
aid organization. The basic purpose of section 1988-to encourage enforcement and observance
of civil rights-permits no distinction between private attorneys and legal aid organizations.").
78. 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977).
79. Pro bono publIco is defined as "for the public good" or "for the welfare of the whole."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
80. Keyes, 439 F. Supp. at 406.
81. See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) ("To allow fees to court-
702 [Vol. 44:695
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recognize that plaintiffs can recover expenses for law clerks and paralegals
as part of their attorney fees, although research expenses are not attorney
fees in the literal sense. 82
Thus, incurring legal expenses is not a prerequisite to a fee award.
Further, the Kay majority's apprehension of creating a "cottage industry"
of lawyers is exaggerated. Many courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have
routinely granted attorney fees to litigants who do not incur legal ex-
penses.8 3 Accordingly, attorney fees may be awarded to prevailing parties
upon the discretion of the court, regardless of whether the litigants are
actually charged for legal expenses by their attorneys.
The Requirement of an Attorney-Client Relationship
The Kay majority also determined that an attorney-client relationship
must exist before collecting attorney fees under fee-shifting statutes. 4 In
general, the retention of an attorney is never required. Claimants have
long brought their grievances to court by litigating pro se. Litigants also
bear the right to self-representation under the Judiciary Act of 1789.5
However, must a lawyer be hired before one can collect attorney fees?
The Sixth Circuit refused attorney fees to the petitioner without offering
a direct examination of section 1988. Other courts analyzing section 1988
have also required an attorney-client relationship before awarding attorney
fees to prevailing parties.16 For example, in Davis v. Parratt,87 a case
appointed counsel will encourage the vindication of civil rights which is the purpose of [§
1988].").
82. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 558-59 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Jones v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1980) (services of attorney's employee would have been
recompensed had she been a paralegal); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.
1979) (attorney fees may include expenses for paralegals); Proulx v. Citibank, 709 F. Supp.
396, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (petitioner could collect attorney fees for law students who counseled
him in school clinical program).
83. The Sixth Circuit in Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 286
(6th Cir. 1974), held that "[t]he fact that Appellee's counsel was a legal services organization,
partially supported by public funds, is irrelevant in determining if an award is proper."
84. The court ruled that the language of a statutory provision for attorney fees "assumes
a paying relationship between an attorney and a client." Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 971 (6th
Cir. 1990) (quoting Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 908 (1984)). The U.S. Supreme Court was not so definitive as the Sixth Circuit,
but said that "it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the
predicate for an award under § 1988." Kay v. Ehrler, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1435, 1437
(1991) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reasoned that the term attorney assumed an agency
relationship based upon the definition of the word. Id. at 1437 n.6.
85. There is a sixth amendment right to self-representation in criminal cases. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 820, 832 (1975). There is also a statutory right to self-representation in
civil cases under the Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (1988)). Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 137 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1172 (1986). The right to self-representation may be denied in rare circumstances.
United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009, 1020 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). But none of the enumerated
circumstances in Davis, which applied to defendants, exists in the Kay case.
86. See, e.g., Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1978).
87. 608 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979).
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involving an inmate who was denied a fee award in his pro se action
against a correctional facility, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that section 1988 "presupposes a relationship of attorney and client.""8
The Davis court and other courts concluded that because section 1988 is
partially designed to give judicial access to the poor, an attorney-client
relationship must exist so that the poor may fully enjoy the benefits of
the legal system. 9
The Kay court argued that without legal advice, claimants will be
unobjective and tend to file meritless claims. ° The Sixth Circuit previously
raised this question of objectivity in Falcone, asserting that when a lawyer
is also the claimant, there can be no filtering of meritless claims by
objective attorneys and that one of the major objectives of the FOIA
would be frustrated.
9
1
Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court disagreed that the statutory
intent behind section 1988 was primarily motivated by filtering out merit-
less claims. 92 The Court held that the more important interest of the law
was to ensure "the effective prosecution of meritorious claims." 93
Fee awards should not be denied to pro se litigants because of the
possible lack of objectivity. In Kay, for example, objectivity was never an
issue. The petitioner was not accused of partiality or filing a frivolous
suit. Indeed, he prevailed substantially on his claim at the lower court.9 4
Nothing in section 1988 indicates that fees are impermissible if counsel is
unobjective. Section 1988 is intended to promote attorney-client relations,
but as explained below, its main goal is to encourage litigation for the
private enforcement of civil rights.95
Assuming that objectivity is required under the statute, objectivity may
not be attained simply by hiring an attorney. In some situations, attorneys
will never be completely impartial. For example, an attorney may have a
contingent stake in the outcome of a case, or an attorney may share a
88. Id. at 718.
89. Id.; see, e.g., Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F.2d 311, 312 (3d Cir. 1982). The same conclusion
is reached in cases regarding the FOIA. See, e.g., Cunningham v. F.B.I., 664 F.2d 383, 384
(3d Cir. 1981).
90. Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 971-72 (6th Cir. 1990). One of the leading cases that
illustrates this argument is White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980), in which the appellant was denied attorney fees under the Truth-
in-Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 38 Stat. 1500, 1518 (1974) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1988)). The court reasoned that effective legal representation depends not
only on legal expertise, but also on a detached and objective perspective, which is frustrated
when lawyers represent themselves. White, 614 F.2d at 388.
91. Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 908 (1984). It should be noted that in the same year of the Falcone decision, another
court held that objectivity was not a critical issue in the FOIA since the statute's real purpose
was to ensure that claimants receive zealous representation from attorneys. Cazalas v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985).
92. Kay v. Ehrler, -- U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1435, 1437-38 (1991).
93. Id. at 1438.
94. Kay v. Ehrler, 90D F.2d 967, 968-69 (6th Cir. 1990).
95. See infra text accampanying notes 153-62.
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social viewpoint with a client and may hope to see the client's cause
prevail. If a litigant has obtained access to the courts and has vindicated
a right as desired under the statute, should it matter whether the client
actually receives objective legal advice? Under section 1988, a court still
has the discretionary power to refuse fees to a winning party if a glaring
lack of objectivity exists. 96
Another weakness of the Kay majority's opinion is the concern that the
courts will be flooded with meritless complaints without objective lawyers
to filter them out.97 By contrast, section 1988 was not drafted to maintain
judicial economy. 98 Nowhere is this issue raised in the Senate and House
reports on section 1988. The Senate Report recognizes that civil rights
laws rely heavily on private enforcement. 99 Additionally, the House Report
states that section 1988 is designed to guarantee access to the courts. 100
Thus, fee awards are one way to promote such litigation as desired by
section 1988.
Other measures besides imposing an attorney-client relationship can be
used to ensure that meritless claims will not enter the federal courts. Most
important is rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states
that an attorney representing a claimant or an unrepresented party must
sign each pleading, motion or other document filed in court.' 0' The sig-
nature by the attorney or unrepresented party indicates that the pleading,
motion, or other document is supported by facts and that the claim is
maintainable under existing law or by a good faith argument for the
"extension, modification or reversal of existing law."' 1 2 If the pleading
does not fulfill the requirements, the court may impose "appropriate
sanctions" upon the attorney, claimant, or both.0 3
In addition, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American
Bar Association contain a proscription against frivolous suits. Rule 3.1
requires that a lawyer bring or defend claims which are not frivolous and
which include good faith arguments for "an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law."' 4 Hence, lawyers who abuse the court system
by filing meritless claims may face disciplinary action by their local bar
associations.0 5
96. Section 1988 states that a fee award may be granted by a court "in its discretion." 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). See supra note 3.
97. Kay, 900 F.2d at 971-72.
98. Neither the Senate or House reports allude to this concern. As stated in the text, the
Senate Report points out that § 1988 is a means to encourage litigation. See S. RaP. No. 1011,
supra note 1, at 4-5.
99. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2.
100. H.R. No. 1558, supra note 4, at 1.
101. FED. R. CIrv. P. 11; see also FaD. R. APp. P. 38 (stating that an appellate court may
single or double an award to an appellee if it determines that the appeal is frivolous).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
103. Id.
104. AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N, MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 62 (1989).
105. Another issue not raised in Kay about why fee awards are contingent upon the existence
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Are Fee Awards a Windfall to Attorneys?
The Kay majority also raised the concern that fee awards for pro se
litigants who are attorneys will lead to unfair consequences.'1 6 The Sixth
Circuit Court, referring to Falcone, rejected the argument that an attor-
ney's opportunity costs are actual pecuniary losses that ought to be re-
imbursed.'1 The court noted that the petitioner incurred no legal expenses,
but merely failed to add to the wealth of his private practice. 08 The court
also voiced dismay about the possibility of creating a "cottage industry"
of inactive lawyers who survive off statutory fee awards if it were to grant
attorney fees to pro se litigants.'z 9
Several federal courts have established that when attorneys litigate a
cause of action separate from their usual practice, they may in fact be
losing money. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ellis
v. Cassidy,"0 a case involving defendants accused of violating a person's
civil rights during a previous foreclosure action, determined that the claim
was frivolous and awarded attorney fees to two of the defendants who
were lawyers."' The Ellis court held that the attorneys' involvement in the
case resulted in pecuniary losses because they were forced by the action
to take time away from their own practices." 2
The same view was echoed in Rybicki v. State Board of Elections,"' a
case involving a complaint that a legislative redistricting plan in Illinois
was unfair to suburban voters outside Chicago. The Rybicki court ruled
that two of the plaintiffs who were lawyers deserved attorney fees because
of an attorney-client relationship is that fee awards for pro se litigants encourage lawyers to
act as both advocates and witnesses. This dual role violates Rule 3.7 of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 690 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir.
1982); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 584 F. Supp. 849, 860-61 (N.D. Ill. 1984). On the
other hand, the argument has been refuted by other courts at the state and federal level. For
example, the court in Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508, 1515 n.21 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986), held that the advocate-witness rule is not applicable to the attorney
pro se litigant, because the rules do not forbid attorneys from representing themselves. See also
Shakman v. Democratic Org., 634 F. Supp. 895, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
106. Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1990).
107. Id. (citing Falcone v. Internal Revenue Serv., 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 908 (1984)). However, a contrary view was reached in Cazalas v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the court recognized the notion
of opportunity costs urder the FOIA. ("Congress evinced its strong desire, by enacting the
FOIA, to establish a national policy of open government through the disclosure of government
information.").
108. Kay, 900 F.2d at 971.
109. Id.
110. 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980).
111. Id. at 231.
112. Id.
113. Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 584 F. Supp. 849, 860 (N.D. II. 1984). See supra
note 105.
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they helped investigate the grievances, consulted with other attorneys, and
assisted the trial lawyers in preparing the case."
4
Lost opportunity costs were also recognized by the Fifth Circuit in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,115 a case which provided the
definitive guidelines widely used by federal courts in calculating attorney
fees." 6 The Johnson case lists as one of the criteria "the preclusion of
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case.""' 7
In any cause of action, the attorney is burdened with important respon-
sibilities prior to the filing of a petition or the commencement of trial.
The lawyer will conduct research, plan strategies, write briefs, and prepare
questions for cross-examination. The witness, on the other hand, only
prepares and rehearses testimony. Moreover, lost opportunity costs are
easy to assess in computing attorney fees because they may be based on
the billable hours the attorney forwent by prosecuting the civil rights
case."' If a court chooses not to use this formula, there are other methods
of calculating fees, such as the twelve-point guidelines of Johnson."9
Despite arguments supporting the doctrine that opportunity costs con-
stitute pecuniary losses, the issue of a "cottage industry" of lawyers who
support themselves through fee-shifting statutes still remains. However,
under section 1988, only prevailing parties are entitled to fee awards, and
these fee awards are subject to a court's discretion. 2 0 Sanctions exist
within the system to preclude abusive practices.' 2 ' Any fee-shifting statute
will ultimately benefit lawyers if its purpose is to intensify litigation.
2 2
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Duncan v. Poythress23 granted
a fee award to an attorney pro se litigant who sued the state of Georgia
114. Id.
115. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
116. The guidelines have also been acknowledged as a test by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1983).
117. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
118. Cazalas, 709 F.2d at 1057. See supra note 85.
119. The Johnson court suggests that the following be considered in each case to calculate
the amount of attorney fees: 1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved; 3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; 4) the preclusion
of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee for
similar work in the community; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; 10) the undesirability of the case; 11)
the nature and length of professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar
cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
A recommendation for assessing attorney fees for pro se litigants who are not lawyers is
proposed in Note, Pro Se Can You Sue?: Attorney Fees for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L.
Rav. 659, 677-83 (1982).
120. See supra note 3.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 101-15.
122. Fee-shifting statutes offer another guarantee to attorneys that they will collect their legal
fees out of the judgment or settlement.
123. 777 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1985). See supra note 7.
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for failing to call a special election. The court recognized that compensating
pro se attorneys who search for violations of civil rights promotes the
purpose of section 1988.124
Therefore, while some courts worry that fee awards to pro se litigants
under fee-shifting statutes constitute a windfall to litigants,' 5 the Duncan
court, one of only three federal circuit courts considering attorney pro se
litigants, held that it is irrelevant whether litigants who advance the con-
gressional purpose of vindicating civil rights choose themselves as their
attorneys. 126 The untenable fear of abusive fee generation in rare circum-
stances is insufficient cause to deny fees to all prevailing litigants. As
demonstrated in the Kay case, allowing this fear to control whether fees
are to be awarded would be unfair to those who bring meritorious complaints
to the court.
The Distinction between Lawyers and Nonlawyers
This note maintains that a pro se litigant need not incur legal expenses
or hire an attorney prior to receiving counsel fees under section 1988 and
that a court may assess fees based on an attorney's billable hours forsaken
while pursuing a civil rights matter. However, in maintaining this position,
it is important to examine why a court should treat any differently pro se
litigants who are not attorneys.
The Sixth Circuit understandably raises doubts about the distinction
between attorneys and nonattorneys.' 27 Most circuit courts have regularly
denied awarding fecs to nonattorney pro se litigants. 2 Nevertheless, some
courts have held that fees may be paid out exclusively to pro se litigants
who are lawyers. 29 Other courts not faced with such questions have hinted
they might treat attorneys differently from laypersons.'30
124. Id. at 1515.
125. See, e.g., Aronson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 866 F.2d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 1989); Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980). These
cases pertain to the FOIA.
126. Duncan, 777 F.2d at 1513.
127. Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Were we to hold that Kay's
opportunity costs constituted pecuniary losses, when we had previously held that Falcone's
opportunity costs were not, we would begin classifying opportunity costs as legal expenses based
upon the substance of the pro se claim. We find no authority for awarding fees based on such
a system.").
128. See, e.g., Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984); Wright v. Crowell, 674 F.2d 521, 521-22 (6th Cir. 1982); Cofield v. Atlanta,
648 F.2d 986, 987 (5ih Cir. Unit B June 1981); Lovell v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170, 171 (Ist Cir.
1981).
129. Both Duncan, 777 F.2d at 1511, and Ellis, 625 F.2d at 230-31, say fees are to be
remitted to attorney pro se litigants. See supra note 7.
130. See, e.g., Smith v. DeBartoli, 769 F.2d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1067 (1986) (the court said that fees were denied to a pro se litigant because of the fact he was
not an attorney); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. Unit A July
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982) (the court denied payment of fees to a pro se litigant
under the Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1902 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552a(g)(3)(B) (1988)), but noted that the ruling might not apply to attorney pro se litigants);
[Vol. 44:695
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/6
NOTES
Courts could avoid making distinctions between pro se attorneys and pro
se laypersons in several ways. First, courts might summarily refuse counsel
fees to all pro se litigants. In turn, this might produce results conflicting
with the purpose behind section 1988, such as blocking access to courts for
certain classes of litigants who can seldom retain legal help, even under fee-
shifting statutes.' Alternatively, the courts might grant attorney fees to all
pro se litigants. But arguably, this contravenes the holding in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 32 in which the United States
Supreme Court ruled that attorney fees should not be granted unless they
are authorized explicitly by statute.
Consequently, the courts have seldom used either approach. 33 Instead,
the trend among the courts prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kay
suggests that pro se attorneys were treated differently from pro se non-
attorneys. Indeed, this contrast has been criticized, as the public might view
it as favoritism, a perception detrimental to a profession already held in
low regard. 3 4 On the other hand, some public policy concerns exist that
support the distinction. For example, if all pro se litigants were granted
attorney fees, nonattorneys would be compensated for legal work even
though such laypersons lacked the legal training of attorneys and were not
bound by the professional rules of the bar.1
31
Rybicki v. State Board of Elections'36 granted attorney fees to plaintiffs
who were lawyers, reasoning that compared with laypersons, the services of
attorneys can be measured by lost time from their own practice and that
attorneys can determine for themselves if a case is meritless. Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit in Duncan v. Poythress37 reiterated the distinction that
attorneys can sell their legal services on the open market. The Duncan court
pointed out that the congressional purpose behind section 1988 of promoting
Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980) (the court
denied fees to a pro se litigant, but suggested they might be available for litigants who forgo
certain income-producing opportunities.).
131. For example, claimants might be unwilling to pursue an unpopular and difficult case by
themselves due to the time and expense involved, and at the same time, they may be unabl6 to
hire lawyers without any assurance that they will win.
132. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975). See supra note 11.
133. The Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia Circuit is the most liberal in awarding
fees to prevailing pro se litigants under various statutes.
134. See, e.g., Culebras Enters. Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 660 F. Supp. 540, 546 (D.P.R. 1987)
("[O]ne can see the guildlike protectionism inherent in this way of thinking"); see also Aronson
v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 866 F.2d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 1989) (a FOIA case).
135. This is a reference to persons not supervised by attorneys, as opposed to legal assistants,
paralegals and others who are supervised because they work within the legal community. See,
e.g., Owens-El v. Robinson, 694 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Congress did not anticipate
that courts would award attorney's fees as compensation to litigants representing themselves,
who, undaunted and seemingly unharmed by ignorance of legal procedure, successfully pressed
a section 1988 claim.").
136. Rybicki, 584 F. Supp. 849, 860 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See text accompanying notes 113-14.
137. Duncan, 777 F.2d at 1514. See text accompanying notes 123-26.
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the use of legal services was fulfilled in the Duncan case, regardless of the
fact that one of the plaintiffs chose to be her own lawyer.'
Despite the rhetoric asserting that fee-shifting statutes primarily benefit
attorneys, 139 several reasons show that fee-shifting statutes ought to treat
lawyers differently from other persons because of the public benefit of
compensating attorneys. For example, pro se litigants suffer opportunity
cost losses, just as lawyers do, but section 1988 and other statutes are
specifically intendel to promote the public interest bar and encourage more
attorneys to accept cases traditionally unrewarding.
14
Moreover, denying fees to all pro se litigants could lead to results which
are inconsistent only for attorneys, whereas nonattorneys are not affected
by such conflicting outcomes. In Kay, for example, the petitioner was denied
fees simply because he chose himself as his attorney. 141 Had he hired an
attorney or had he represented someone else in the same case as an attorney,
he would have received attorney fees. These paradoxes show that the
"American" rule may sometimes lead to unfair results if statutes are adhered
to rigidly.
142
The Legislative Purpose of Section 1988
The shortcomings of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning alone probably would
not-justify a fee award to the petitioner in Kay v. Ehrler. Such a grant
would have to be supported by examining the statutory intent of section
1988. Although not raised in Kay, one strong argument used by other courts
against fee awards to attorney pro se litigants is that section 1988 is partially
intended to provide access to the courts for the disenfranchised.
43
138. Duncan, 777 F.2d at 1513.
139. When § 1988 was being debated in the Congress in 1976, some were denouncing it as
the "lawyer's relief bill." 122 CoNG. REc. S31,832 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (statement of Sen.
Abourezk).
140. Note, Pro Se Can You Sue?: Attorney Fees for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L. Ray.
659, 665 (1982).
141. Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 1990).
142. Perhaps one reason why the question of compensation for pro se litigants arises in the
first place is because of the inflexibility of the "American" rule, in which fees are compensable
only in certain circumstances, resulting in the preclusion of judicial access for some people. In
contrast, the losing party in England pays the attorney fees of the winner. Hamilton v. Daley,
777 F.2d 1207, 1211 (7th Cir. 1985). The effect is said to eliminate frivolous litigation and
increase access to the courts. 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.70[2] (2d ed. 1990).
143. For example, the federal district court in Lawrence v. Staats, 586 F. Supp. 1375 (D.D.C.
1984), refused counsel ftes to an attorney pro se litigant who brought a suit against the federal
government for discriminating against him on the basis of race. The Lawrence court stated that
the underlying purpose behind § 1988 is to provide access to the courts and reasoned that a
pro se attorney "is not hampered from obtaining counsel and gaining access to the courts by
poverty; he appears him3elf." Id. at 1379.
The Supreme Court also focused on this argument in reviewing Kay. It concluded that the
"more specific purpose" of § 1988 was the retention of lawyers for those otherwise unable to
afford them. Kay v. Ehrler, .. U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 1435, 1437 (1991). But even the Supreme
Court could not say with absolute certainty that this was the statute's paramount purpose, as
it stated that it only seemed likely that Congress envisioned an attorney-client relationship. Id.
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A reading of the House Report on section 1988 shows that judicial access
was one important reason for passing the statute, but not its only purpose.
The House Report states that section 1988 is contemplated to ensure "ef-
fective access" to the courts for those with civil rights grievances. 44 The
federal district court reiterated the same objective in Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens
& Company.'4 The court explained that the purpose of awarding fees is to
attract competent counsel to guarantee the enforcement of civil rights.'"
Simply because the Act is intended to foster judicial access does not mean
that an attorney-client relationship is required. The Senate Report disap-
proved of a narrow reading of the statute, 47 which is what the Sixth Circuit
and the Supreme Court were doing in Kay. 4 By contrast, section 1988 is
merely intended to open the door to professional legal advice when desired
by litigants, not to require an attorney-client relationship.1
49
Indeed, if promoting access to the courts for the poor were the only
purpose behind section 1988, the statute is doomed to fail to reach this
goal. The disenfranchised would still be denied access to the courts under
fee-shifting statutes if lawyers do not take their cases. Civil rights actions
seldom yield large damage awards because they generally provide injunctive
relief. 50 Lawyers need economic incentives to accept such cases.' 5' A plaintiff
who may not prevail in an action may have difficulty retaining a lawyer.
Even if a plaintiff is likely to win a case, the plaintiff may still have trouble
hiring an attorney because of extraneous factors.1 2 Thus, for some plaintiffs,
pro se litigation may be their only course to justice.
Finally, the other major purpose of section 1988 continuously mentioned
in the Senate and House reports is to increase the private enforcement of
civil rights. 3 Congress intended for individuals to champion the cause of
basic civil liberties because the government is not always able to do so. For
example, the Senate Report on section 1988 said that civil rights laws heavily
depend upon private enforcement and that fee awards are an essential
remedy for private citizens in order to grant them opportunities to vindicate
their civil rights within the spirit of congressional policies.'1"
144. H.R. No. 1558, supra note 4, at 1.
145. 441 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. N.C. 1977).
146. Id. at 849.
147. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 3.
148. The Sixth Circuit insisted on an attorney-client relationship without drawing support
from the Senate Report. Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1990).
149. Duncan v. Poythress, 572 F. Supp. 776, 778-79 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("The primary concern
of Congress was to increase the level of competence with which [civil rights] complaints are
prosecuted ... ").
150. Levine v. Heffernan, 691 F. Supp. 173, 175 (V.D. Wis. 1988).
151. Id. at 176.
152. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974), pointed out that a lawyer's attempt to eliminate a civil rights
infraction may not be well received by the community in which the attorney lives, perhaps
having an economic impact on the attorney's practice.
153. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 1, at 2; H.R. No. 1558, supra note 4, at 1.
154. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 4, at 3-4.
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The concept of the private attorney general also arose during the con-
gressional debate on section 1988, as members of both the Senate and the
House recognized that the federal government is limited in its ability to
execute civil rights laws."' Therefore, the public, or more specifically, the
very victims of civil rights infractions, had to be given the means to fight
against such injustices.1 6 The function of the private attorney general has
also been emphasized in the courts, some of which have suggested that
private enforcement is the paramount goal of section 1988.157
To achieve the goal of private enforcement, section 1988 must enable the
disenfranchised to obtain access to the courts."' The responsibility of private
enforcement certainly cannot be left to the public interest lawyers and social
activists only. The victims must also be able to prosecute their own causes
of action. Thus, section 1988 has a twofold purpose - to encourage
litigation and to provide access to legal help if needed.
The Sixth Circuit and, later, the Supreme Court approached the issue of
fee-shifting statutes too narrowly. For example, although the Sixth Circuit
did not discuss section 1988 directly, the opinion in Kay suggests that if
litigants do not hire attorneys, as encouraged by fee-shifting statutes, they
will thwart the purpose of such legislation.5 9 Thus, the Sixth Circuit would
limit the intent of section 1988 to obtaining legal advice. The opinion
ignores the fact that the petitioner in Kay fulfilled the other fundamental
objective of section 1988 - to challenge those who impair the civil rights
of other people.6° The petitioner brought an action against the state of
Kentucky and successfully ended its practice of discriminatorily choosing
which candidates will appear on its election ballots. However, the Sixth
Circuit completely overlooked the public benefit derived from Kay's suit
against Kentucky.
155. "The Government obviously does not have the resources to investigate and prosecute
all possible violations; of the Constitution, so a great burden falls directly on the victims to
enforce their own right,.. Our laws should facilitate that private enforcement, and should-
within reasonable limits--encourage potential civil rights plaintiffs to bring meritorious cases."
122 CoNo. Rac. H35,123 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (statement of Rep. Seiberling).
156. See, e.g., 122 CCNG. REc. S31,471 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Sen. Scott);
id. S31,472 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. 531,832 (daily ed. Sept.
22, 1976) (statement of Sen. Hathaway). These senators, among others, argue for the need of
private enforcement.
157. See Duncan, 777 F.2d at 1512 ("[A]nother more general purpose of section 1988 is to
encourage private citizens to vindicate important constitutional and congressional policies.");
Lanasa v. New Orleans, 619 F. Supp. 39, 44 (E.D. La. 1985) ("The fee provision is designed
to promote vigorous advocacy on behalf of citizens whose civil rights have been violated...");
see also Hamilton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207, 1211 (7th Cir. 1985); Riddle v. Nat'l Democratic
Party, 624 F.2d 539, 54? (5th Cir. 1980).
158. The Supreme Court enunciated this purpose by relying on the Senate and House reports
and subcommittee hearing reports. Kay v. Ehrler, ...- U.S. - , II1 S. Ct. 1435, 1437 n.8
(1991).
159. Kay v. Ehrler, 9C0 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1990).
160. Again, this was the second time Kay had to sue Kentucky to prohibit this practice. See
Kay v. Mills, 490 F. Sul~p. 844 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
[Vol. 44:695
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/6
NOTES
Because Kay did not discuss section 1988, its opinion is fundamentally
flawed. The court assumed that the Falcone reasoning was applicable to the
case, even though section 1988 has been distinguished from the FOIA by
other courts.' 6' Even if Falcone is apposite, the Kay majority's reasoning is
in itself inconsistent. First, legal expenses do not have to be incurred by a
client prior to obtaining attorney fees. Second, an attorney-client relationship
is not required under section 1988. Third, fee awards to pro se attorney-
litigants do not constitute a windfall to attorneys in light of their lost
opportunity costs. Fourth, attorneys ought to be distinguished from non-
attorneys to maintain professional standards in the legal field. And fifth,
the purpose of section 1988 is not limited to providing legal help for the
disenfranchised.
Any strict view of any fee-shifting statute might lead to results inherently
unfair to aggrieved parties. As discussed above, litigants may still be unable
to retain lawyers, even with fee-shifting statutes in place. Furthermore, pro
se litigants seeking injunctive relief are vulnerable to protracted litigation
tactics if other parties know they will not have to pay for legal fees. Section
1988 is certainly not meant to be examined conservatively, as Congress and
the federal courts have indicated that the statute is meant to be interpreted
broadly.
62
The Kay court's heavy reliance on Falcone is perhaps due to the difficulty
in distinguishing between attorneys and nonattorneys and to the division of
the federal courts over the issue of granting fees to pro se litigants, even
under the FOIA.16 1 This perhaps explains the similar reasoning behind the
Supreme Court's opinion, in which the Court mainly applied practical
considerations to reach its decision rather than clear-cut points of law.
Conclusion
Section 1988 is a federal statute intended to enable victims of civil rights
violations to collect attorney fees from their opponents in court. Thus,
victims will be motivated to bring their actions to court without concerning
themselves with the burden of legal expenses. Because the government alone
cannot handle the myriad cases of civil rights complaints, Congress meant
for section 1988 to be interpreted liberally by the federal courts. Congress
realized that receiving attorney fees must be made easy for victims so that
private citizens would be encouraged to enforce civil rights laws. Attorney
pro se litigants should also receive attorney fees in their actions, as they
help promote the purpose of section 1988.
161. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Staats, 586 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D.D.C. 1984) ("ITihe intent of
Congress and purpose of FOIA and its fee provisions differ significantly from the intent and
purposes of [§ 1988] . . .").
162. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Cunningham v. F.B.I., 664 F.2d 383, 387-89 (3d Cir. 1981) (pro se litigant is
not entitled to attorney fees under the FOIA); Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(pro se litigant is entitled to fees under the FOIA).
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By contrast, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court did not reach such a conclusion in Kay v. Ehrler.164 The
Supreme Court's brief analysis relied more on public policy arguments than
the legislative intent behind section 1988. And the Sixth Circuit's opinion,
relying on Falcone, fiiled to explain why attorney pro se litigants should
not be awarded fees under section 1988.
The dissenting opinion in Kay points out that the Sixth Circuit was
incorrect in applying Falcone. Instead, the dissent recognizes that section
1988 is designed to reward successful claimants who vindicate constitutional
rights for themselves and for others. This is what the petitioner accomplished
in Kay. Because he fulfilled one of the primary purposes of section 1988,
the petitioner should have received attorney fees, even though he appeared
in court as an attorney pro se claimant.
Peter Bagley
164. The dissenting opinion in the Sixth Circuit case did, however, make such a conclusion.
Kay, 900 F.2d at 972-73.
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